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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 

















JIM LYNCH; FIBERLIGHT, LLC; 
THERMO DEVELOPMENT, INC.; FL 
INVESTMENT HOLDINGS, LLC; NT 
ASSETS, LLC; AND THERMO 
TELECOM PARTNERS, LLC 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
,P 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' I Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon 
consideration of the record, the motions, the briefs, and counsels' oral arguments, the Court finds 
as follows: 
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
FiberLight, LLC ("FiberLight") is a Delaware limited liability company formed under the 
laws of Delaware in April of 2005 with its principal place of business in Georgia. Plaintiff 
Michael Miller ("Miller"), Defendant Thermo Telecom Partners, LLC ("Thermo Telecom"), and 
four others were the original members of FiberLight. In 2006, Thermo Telecom and Defendant 
NT Assets, LLC ("NT Assets") made large multi-million dollar convertible loans to FiberLight. 
In 2007, these loans were converted to majority ownership interest in FiberLight. The 
management of FiberLight is vested in the Board. Both Miller and Defendant Jim Lynch 
I Collectively, Defendants Thermo Telecom, Thermo Development, FL Investment, and NT 
Assets will be referred to as the "Thermo Entities." 
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("Lynch") served on the Board and both held officer positions: Miller as President and Lynch as 
Chairman. 
Between April of2005 and the filing of this suit, FiberLight's Operating Agreement was 
amended several times, including several amendments at issue in this suit: Third Amended 
Operating Agreement effective January 1,2006 (the "Third Amendment"), Fourth Amended 
Operating Agreement effective October 27,2008 (the "Fourth Amendment"), and Fifth 
Amended Operating Agreement effective March 10,2011 (the "Fifth Amendment"). 
The Third Amendment reflects the conversion of Thermo Telecom and NT Assets' loans 
and divides ownership interests into Investor Interests and Incentive Interests. It allowed 
Thermo Telecom and NT Assets, as majority owners holding approximately 98% ownership 
interest, to appoint up to three directors to the Board as their designees or appoint one designee 
who would have three votes. Their appointed director designee was Lynch. The other directors 
were Miller and Kevin Coyne, a minority member and FiberLight's Chief Operating Officer, 
with one vote each. The Third Amendment included a formula to pay members if FiberLight 
was sold. It also set up a vesting schedule for Incentive Interests, including redemption values if 
an Incentive Member's employment with FiberLight was terminated. The Chairman had the 
authority to terminate the President as well. Finally, the Third Amendment authorized the 
majority members to amend the Operating Agreement without unanimous consent. 
The Fourth Amendment adjusted the Percentage Interest between members, reducing 
Miller's Percentage Interest from 0.5804% to 0.4863% and increasing Thermo Telecom's and 
NT Assets' Percentage Interest from a combined 98.3450% to 98.6097%. Otherwise, the Fourth 
Amendment had no other material changes. 
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The Fifth Amendment changed the definition of "Gain Percentage" to place a cap on the 
percentage used to calculate the payout to investors if FiberLight was sold at certain prices. 
The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments were reviewed by and discussed among 
FiberLight's members and all three Amendments were reviewed and signed by Miller. While 
Miller admits that he was able to suggest minor changes, he testified in his deposition that the 
major Amendment terms were not up for negotiation. Miller testified that he believed he had no 
choice but to sign or lose his job. He also testified that Jay Monroe, who controls the Thermo 
Entities, left a voicemail message saying that if Miller did not sign, he "would be sorry." There 
is no evidence when these purported threats occurred or in connection with which Amendment. 
Miller could not recall whether Monroe's message was left in relation to the Third, Fourth, or 
Fifth Amendment. 
It is undisputed that Miller was an experienced businessman with a full range of 
telecommunications experiences as the former President and CEO of Xspedius Fiber Group and 
ACSI NT. Miller understood equity positions in companies, as well as dilutions in equity 
interest as a result of the exercise of convertible loans from debt to equity. Finally, Miller 
understood that he was an at-will employee at FiberLight. 
On February 4, 2013, Miller was terminated without cause from his position as President 
of FiberLight. At the time of his termination, the Fifth Amendment was in effect. Following 
Miller's termination, FiberLight sought to repurchase Miller's interest in FiberLight pursuant to 
the Fifth Amendment's Sections 4.5 and 10.3. Miller does not dispute that he knew the 
redemption of his interest was a possibility at the time he signed the Fifth Amendment. 
Nonetheless, Miller has rejected FiberLight's attempts to redeem his interests and seeks to 
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invalidate these two provisions of the Fifth Amendment based on economic duress and 
unconscionability. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary Judgment should be granted when the movant shows "that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). "A defendant may do this by showing the court the documents, 
affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient 
to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff s case." Carpenter v. Sun 
Valley Properties, LLC, 285 Ga. App. 1, 1-2 (2007); Scarborough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 
829 (1999). 
To avoid summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code 
section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. § 
9-11-56( e). "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge" and 
"shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." Id. "[M]ere speculation, 
conjecture, or possibility [are] insufficient to preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 
Ga. 767, 768 (2011). "Hearsay, opinions, and conclusions in affidavits are inadmissible on 
summary judgment." Langley v. Nat'l Labor Grp., Inc., 262 Ga. App. 749, 751 (2003). The 
Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morgan v. Barnes, 
221 Ga. App. 653, 654 (1996). 
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III. ANAL YSIS 
A. Choice of Law 
In their Motion, Defendants argue for dismissal of Miller's claims under both Georgia 
and Delaware law. FiberLight is a Delaware LLC and its Operating Agreement and its 
subsequent Amendments select Delaware law as governing. Contractual forum-selection clauses 
are traditionally universally valid and presumptively accepted. Carson v. Obor Holding Co., 
LLC, 318 Ga. App. 645, 648 (2012). As such, Delaware law will apply for any claims requiring 
the Court to construe the Operating Agreement and Amendments. Defendants argue that 
Georgia law should apply to Miller's tort claims since Georgia is the site of the harm. See Dowis 
v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 279 Ga. 808, 809 (2005) ("a tort action is governed by the substantive law 
of the state where the tort was committed"). However, a Georgia statute makes clear that: 
The laws of the jurisdiction under which a foreign limited liability company is 
organized govern its organization and internal affairs and the liability of its 
managers, members, and other owners, regardless of whether the foreign limited 
liability company procured or should have procured a certificate of authority 
under this chapter. 
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-701; see also Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Associates, Architects & 
Planners, Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 736 (1985) (local law of the state of incorporation applies to claims 
involving internal affairs of foreign corporation, even those that have obtained a certificate of 
authority to transact business in Georgia). FiberLight is a foreign LLC under Georgia law since 
it is organized under the laws of Delaware. Therefore, the COUli will apply Delaware law to all 
Counts, including the contractual, quasi-contractual, and tort claims. 
Georgia law will apply to arguments regarding whether claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations. See Lloyd v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 211 Ga. App. 247, 248 (1993) (physical precedent 
only) (holding the trial court erred in applying Virginia statute of limitations to claims subject to 
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Virginia's substantive laws because the statute of limitations statutes "look only to the remedy 
and so are procedural." Georgia has not enacted any statutes authorizing the court "to apply the 
statutory bar of a foreign state whose laws are found to govern the contract."). 
B. The Individual Claims of the Amended Complaint 
Count 1: Breach of Fiduciary Duty (by Controlling Members of FiberLight, 
Lynch and Thermo Entities) 
The Amended Complaint alleges Lynch and the Thermo Entities breached their fiduciary 
duties to Miller by: (a) restructuring the Operating Agreements through amendments containing 
oppressive terms at the expense of FiberLight's minority members; (b) inducing Miller to 
execute the Amendments by threats of adverse consequences; ( c) acquiring the right to terminate 
Miller and redeem his interest in FiberLight at below fair market value through forced execution 
of the Third Amendment; (d) reducing the value of Miller's Incentive Interests through forced 
execution of the Fifth Amendment; (e) causing FiberLight to terminate Miller in order to divest 
him of his FiberLight interest at below market value; and (f) exercising its contractual discretion 
to redeem Miller's membership interests upon his termination. Though not spelled out in the 
Amended Complaint, Miller also alleges Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by refusing 
to pursue possible offers to purchase FiberLight that would have profited the minority members. 
"A claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of two elements: (1) that a fiduciary 
duty existed and (2) that the defendant breached that duty." Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 
A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch.), aff'd sub nom. ASDI, Inc. v. Beard Research, Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 
2010). 
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1. Whether Thermo Entities as majority member owe duties to Miller as 
minority member 
Under Delaware's Limited Liability Company Act ("LLC Act"), a member's or 
manager's fiduciary duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the 
limited liability company agreement. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) & (e). Delaware's 
Court of Chancery has interpreted this statute to imply that the managers of an LLC owe 
traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the LLC and its members. See, e.g., Auriga 
Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40 A.3d 839, 843 (Del. Ch. 2012); Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 
62 A.3d 649, 661 (Del. Ch. 2012). "The corollary of that proposition, however, is that while 
managers and managing members owe default fiduciary duties, 'passive members do not,' absent 
a modification of the LLC agreement or facts suggesting that the purportedly passive member 
was acting in a managerial capacity." CMS Inv. Holdings, LLC v. Castle, No. CV 9468-VCP, 
2015 WL 3894021, at *18 (Del. Ch. June 23,2015) (quoting Feeley at 662). 
Here, the Thermo Entities were more than just "passive" members of FiberLight. The 
Thermo Entities ultimately controlled the makeup of the Board. They were authorized to appoint 
a designee as a director who would be entitled to three of the five votes, and they appointed 
Lynch as that Board designee. Furthermore, the Thermo Entities could elect or remove other 
directors as they held a majority of FiberLight's Percentage Interests, approximately 98%. The 
Thermo Entities could also amend the Operating Agreement without the consent of the other 
Members under Section 14.2. Indeed, they exercised this authority by amending the Fifth 
Amendment to transfer interests between the Thermo Entities.2 Since the Thermo Entities were 
more than just "passive" members of FiberLight they owed fiduciary duties to Miller as a 
2 Amendment No.1 to the Fifth Amendment dated March 18,2011, memorializes Thermo 
Telecom's transfer of Partnership Interest in FiberLight to Defendant FL Investment Holdings, 
LLC ("FL Investment" and Thermo Development, Inc. ("Thermo Development"). 
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minority member to the extent such duties are not excluded under the Operating Agreement and 
subsequent Amendments. 
In this case there is a provision of the Operating Agreement Amendments limiting a 
member's liability. Section 4.2 states: 
[N]o Member shall be shall be personally liable for any debt, obligation, or 
liability of the Company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, solely by 
reason of being a Member of the Company. Neither the Company nor any 
Director or [O]fficer shall have any right, claim, or cause of action against any 
Member of the Company arising out of such Member having acted or failed to act 
in accordance with such Member's rights or obligations as a Member hereunder. 
Miller's claim against the Thermo Entities is not based on their being liable for a debt, 
obligation, or liability of FiberLight. It is based solely on their own wrongdoing. Thus, the first 
sentence does not apply here. The second sentence of Section 4.2 bars a director or officer from 
making a claim against a member. As Miller points out, his claims against the Thermo Entities 
in this Count are brought solely in his capacity as a member and not as an officer or a director. 
Having found no bar to protect the Thermo Entities from potential liability as majority members, 
the COUli now turns to the alleged breaches. 
2. As Controlling Members, did Thermo Entities or Lynch, as their Agent, Breach 
Fiduciary Duties Owed to Miller? 
The first theory of liability alleged is that the Thermo Entities breached their fiduciary 
duties to Miller by coercing him to sign the Third,3 Fourth, and Fifth Amendments with terms 
unfavorable to him through the use of threats and economic duress. "Economic duress is duress 
3 Under the Second Amendment, Thermo Telecom only held 6.4678% interest in FiberLight; 
Miller, Coyne, and another individual together held the majority interest. Thermo Telecom 
became a majority member by virtue of its debt to equity conversion, which was memorialized in 
the Third Amendment. Before the Third Amendment was executed, Thermo Telecom did not 
hold a majority membership interest and any duress would be because of their large creditor 
position in FiberLight and not by virtue of their status as FiberLight members. 
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directed against a person's business interests, and is often referred to as 'business compulsion .. '" 
Edge a/the Woods v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, No. CIV.A 97C-09-281-JEB, 2001 WL 
946521at *4 (Del. Super. Aug. 16,2001). For the economic duress defense4 to be available three 
elements must be present: "(1) a wrongful act which (2) overcomes the free will of the person (3) 
who has no adequate legal remedy to protect his interests." ld. 
In the defense of duress, the actions complained of must be wrongful, but not 
necessarily unlawful. In claiming economic duress, one must be deprived of the 
free exercise of his will through wrongful threats or acts directly against a 
person's business interest. Generally, the threat to exercise a LegaL or 
contractual right that the maker of the threat clearly holds is not, in and of 
itself, improper. 
ld. at *5 (emphasis added). See also Block Fin. Corp. v. lnisoft Corp., No. CIV.A. 03C-04-010, 
2006 WL 3240010 at *5 (Del. Super. Oct. 30,2006) (granting summary judgment as to 
economic duress claim where party's threats-it would not provide access to software to plaintiff 
or cooperate in plaintiff's efforts to fix its software if it did not sign an agreement-were based 
on contractual and legal rights it held). "Mere hard bargaining is insufficient to constitute 
duress, even when one of the parties is in financial difficulty." Edge a/the Woods at *5; Block at 
*5. 
As an initial matter, Miller was a well-informed and sophisticated businessman, and 
consulted an attorney in connection with reviewing the Amendments. He was given the 
opportunity to suggest revisions to the Amendments and the evidence shows he reviewed and 
understood each Amendment. He understood the conversion of debt to equity and he understood 
4 Here, Miller is not seeking to void a contract using the defense of economic duress; the Third 
and Fourth Amendments were superseded by the terms of the Fifth Amendment and Miller is 
seeking to void certain provisions of the Fifth Amendment in his claims for Declaratory Relief, 
discussed infra. Instead, Miller here is alleging that economic duress was a wrongful act in 
breach of the Thermo Entities' fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. The COUlt will use the same 
elements to establish whether there is a material issue of fact as to whether Miller suffered 
economic duress. 
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that he was an at-will employee. Further, there is no evidence of a wrongful act that overcame 
Miller's free will by either the Thermo Entities directly or through Lynch as their agent. Miller 
testified at his deposition that he feared he would lose his job ifhe refused to sign the 
Amendments, including Monroe's statement to sign or he "would be sorry." However, Miller 
could not recall whether any of these purported threats were made prior to signing the Third, 
Fourth, or Fifth Amendment. Thus, even if a factfinder determined these statements exceeded 
the bounds of aggressive negotiation and were instead wrongfully coercive, it is mere speculation 
which Amendment was induced by which statements. There is simply no evidence that Miller 
objected to any of the Amendments or that he exercised any of his legal or contractual rights to 
contest the Amendments by, for example, calling for a special meeting or asserting appraisal 
rights, when asked to execute any of these Amendments. Instead, the evidence shows that he 
read and ultimately executed each Amendment. 5 The Court finds a complete lack of evidence 
from which a factfinder could find that the execution of these Amendments was the result of 
economic duress or threats of adverse consequences by the Thermo Entities directly or through 
their purported agent, Lynch. 6 
5 Miller also claims that he was under duress to sign the Fifth Amendment because he was going 
through a divorce and could not face the prospect of uncertain financial position. However, his 
divorce fails to satisfy the elements of economic duress. Miller's divorce was not a "wrongful 
act" by Defendants that overcame Miller's free will and there is no evidence that his divorce 
somehow limited Miller's access to an adequate legal remedy to protect his interests. 
6 The Court also believes that a claim that the Third Amendment was executed under duress 
would be barred under the applicable statute of limitations. In Georgia, any claim that a contract 
is voidable due to duress in executing the document is subject to a seven year statute of 
limitations. Mehdikarimi v. Emaddazfuli, 268 Ga. 428, 429 (1997). The statute of limitations for 
a breach of fiduciary claim is six years. See Niloy & Rohan, LLC v. Sechler, 335 Ga. App. 507, 
512 (2016) (citation omitted) ("To the extent that N & R's breach of fiduciary duty claims arise 
out of the Operating Agreement, a six-year statute oflimitation would apply."). The Third 
Amendment clearly states that the Amendment was deemed executed on the effective date of 
January 1,2006, more than seven years before the filing of this breach of fiduciary claim. 
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Turning to the actions related to Miller's termination and the redemption of his interest in 
FiberLight, these actions were taken pursuant to and in compliance with the Operating 
Agreement and its subsequent Amendments. Under Delaware's LLC Act, a member or manager 
is not liable to any party for breach of fiduciary duty when the member or manager has relied in 
good faith on provisions of the agreement. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-110 1 (d); see also Nemec 
v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1129 (Del. 2010) ("It is a well-settled principle that where a dispute 
arises from obligations that are expressly addressed by contract, that dispute will be treated as a 
breach of contract claim. In that specific context, any fiduciary claims arising out of the same 
facts that underlie the contract obligations would be foreclosed as superfluous."). 
As a preliminary matter, Miller was terminated as President, not terminated from his 
position as a minority member. As discussed above, Section 4.2 of the Fifth Amendment bars 
officers from holding members, which includes the Thermo Entities, liable. Plaintiff is clear that 
he is suing in his capacity as a minority member and there is no evidence that his membership 
status was in any way affected by his termination as President. 
Section 6.1 of the Fifth Amendment states that "the Chairman shall have the authority to 
terminate the President's employment." Therefore, Lynch's termination of Miller as President 
Miller's argument that it is a factual issue when the Third Amendment was actually signed is 
unavailing. Miller would have the COUli consider extrinsic evidence in the face of an 
unambiguous contract. Further the COUli rejects Miller's argument that the cause of action did 
not accrue until adverse actions were taken under the Amendments, like the rejection of possible 
offers and Miller's termination. Additionally, the Third Amendment was no longer the operative 
Amendment when these actions were taken. And finally, the weight of Georgia law on the tolling 
of a breach of fiduciary duty claim such as this suggests that the cause of action accrued on the 
execution of the document. See, e.g., Kerce v. Bent Tree Corp., 166 Ga. App. 728, 729 (1983) 
(holding that cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty alleging that a contract was 
fraudulently induced through economic duress accrues when the contract was executed); 
Mayfield v. Heiman, 317 Ga. App. 322, 325 (2012) (holding that a cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty relating to the mismanagement of a trust would accrue when the trustee closed on 
a loan transaction, not years later when loan payments exceeded loan proceeds). 
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was expressly authorized under the Operating Agreement and cannot be the basis of liability for 
breach of fiduciary duty against Lynch as Chairman. This claim is equally doomed against 
Lynch as an agent of the Thermo Entities. Lynch testified at his deposition that he terminated 
Miller for "poor performance." Before Lynch terminated Miller he discussed it with Monroe and 
Monroe approved of the termination. Although Lynch believed Miller should be terminated 
based on his performance, the parties concede that he was ultimately terminated without cause. 
There is no evidence that Lynch terminated Miller at the direction of or under the control of the 
Thermo Entities." 
Finally, turning to the alleged offers the rejection of which Miller claims breached 
Defendants' fiduciary duties, the Court begins by pointing out that the breach was not set forth in 
the Amended Complaint' and the argument set forth in Miller's brief in opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is that it was a violation of the Third Amendment 
although at the time the Fourth Amendment was in effect. Nevertheless, the Court will address 
this claim. Miller's affidavit states that Lynch received and rejected offers to purchase 
7 The only purported evidence that Lynch was an "agent" of the Thermo Entities is the reference 
in the Amendments to Lynch as the "Therrno/Nf Assets Designee" to the FiberLight Board. In 
Coyne's deposition testimony he stated that he understood that Lynch was the Thermo Entities' 
"representative" on the FiberLight Board and that he spoke for the Thermo Entities. Here, 
however, Lynch was acting under his express authority as Chairman and there is no evidence that 
he was acting as Thermo's designee to the Board when he terminated Miller. Relevant factors to 
consider in a determination whether an agency relationship exists include "the extent of control, 
which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; whether or not 
the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; and whether or not the parties 
believe they are creating the relation of master and servant." See Waveliivision Holdings, LLC 
v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 49 A.3d 1168, 1177 (Del. 20 12) (quoting Fisher v. Townsends, 
Inc., 695 A.2d 53 (Del. 1997» (affirming trial court's determination on summary judgment that 
agency relationship was not established because, although normally a question of fact, no 
factfinder could reasonably conclude, based on evidence presented, that agency relationship 
existed). 
8 See Lima Delta Company, et al. v. Global Aerospace, Inc., A16A0643 (Ga. Ct. App., July 12, 
2016) (quoting R. W Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859,866(2) (2004». 
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Fiberl.ight without his taking them to the Board to consider. In his brief, he argues that the 
breach was that he and the other minority members would have benefitted from a sale of 
FiberLight at that point because the Fifth Amendment put a cap on their Incentive Interest. There 
is no indication in the record that there were any offers at all. Lynch in his deposition testified 
that Quanta sent a letter of intent in 2010 but that it never was an offer. In 2011, FiberLight 
engaged investment bankers and produced a confidential memorandum for purposes of finding a 
buyer, but nothing substantial ever came from the effort. And Quenta never appeared at that 
time with an offer. The COUli cannot find a breach of fiduciary duty on these vague allegations. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count 1 is GRANTED. 
Count 2: Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duties (Against Lynch 
and FiberLight) 
Under Delaware law, a third party may be liable for aiding and abetting a fiduciary's 
breach of a duty by showing: "(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) a breach of the 
fiduciary's duty, ... (3) knowing participation in that breach by the defendants, and (4) damages 
proximately caused by the breach." Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001) 
(citations omitted). It is nonsensical that the LLC involved could aid and abet a member in 
breaching fiduciary duties to another member. Further, since the Court has found that the 
Thermo Entities did not breach their fiduciary duties to Miller, Lynch could not have aided and 
abetted a breach. Summary judgment as to Count 2 is GRANTED. 
Count 3: Breach of Contract (Against All Defendants) 
Miller claims that Defendants breached the terms of the Fourth Agreement by forcing 
Miller under economic duress to enter into a less advantageous Fifth Agreement. Section 14.2 of 
the Fourth Amendment states: 
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This Agreement ... may be amended with the agreement of Members holding a 
majority of the Percentage Interests; provided, however, that no amendment 
which adversely affects the rights of any Member in a manner materially different 
from the other Members shall be effective against such Member without the 
written consent of such Member. For clarification, the Members agree that an 
amendment that affects all Members will not be deemed to "adversely affect" any 
individual Member in a "manner materially different" from the other Members 
simply because of the Members' differing levels of ownership in the Company. 
All amendments shall be in writing. 
Here, the Fifth Amendment was in writing and Miller's execution of the Fifth Amendment 
demonstrates his written consent. Miller's claims that he did not willingly consent but rather he 
signed under economic duress were not supported by evidence as discussed above. Finally, there 
is no evidence that Miller's rights under the Fifth Amendment were adversely affected in a 
materially different way from other Members. The changes made to the definition of "Gain 
Percentage" in the Fifth Amendments provided a higher payout to the members holding 98% 
interest in FiberLight as opposed to the minority members each holding less than 1 % interest in 
FiberLight. To the extent this adjustment treats members materially different, it does so on the 
basis of differing levels of ownership, which is expressly permitted under Section 14.2. 
As such, summary judgment as to Count 3 is GRANTED. 
Count 4: Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Against 
All Defendants) 
Miller alleges Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by taking 
advantage of their superior bargaining power as majority members when they (1) threatened 
consequences if Miller failed to execute the Fifth Amendment; (2) terminated Miller's 
employment without cause; and (3) sought to redeem Miller's interests after his termination. 
"The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every contract and 
requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct 
which has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the fruits' of the 
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bargain." Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C, 971 A.2d 872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009) (quotations and 
citations omitted) (affirming Court of Chancery's grant of motion to dismiss breach of good faith 
and fair dealing claim). These implied covenants cannot override or contradict express 
contractual terms or rights. Id.; see also Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Del. 2010). 
The Courts should be cautious and conservative in inferring implied covenants, and should do so 
only to fill contractual gaps that neither party anticipated. Kuruda at 888; Nemec at 1125-26. 
The COUli must not rewrite a contract to appease the party who now sees the contract as a bad 
deal; "[p]arties have a right to enter into good and bad contracts, the law enforces both." Nemec 
at 1126. "Thus, to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant, [the plaintiff] must allege a 
specific implied contractual obligation, a breach of that obligation by the defendant, and 
resulting damage to the plaintiff." Kuruda at 888. "General allegations of bad faith conduct are 
not sufficient." Id. "Consistent with its narrow purpose, the implied covenant is only rarely 
invoked successfully." Id.; see also Nemec at 1128 ("the covenant is a limited and extraordinary 
legal remedy."). 
The COUli has already determined there is no basis in fact to support Miller's contention 
that the execution of the Fifth Amendment was procured by threats of economic duress. Miller 
ultimately executed the Fifth Amendment setting the terms for termination of employment and 
the subsequent redemption of his Percentage Interest. The terms of the Fifth Amendment clearly 
allow Lynch as Chairman to terminate Miller as President without cause and to request 
redemption of Miller's ownership interests pursuant to explicit formulas in the Fifth 
Amendment. While Miller may now view the Fifth Amendment as a bad deal for him 
financially, the Court will not rewrite express terms under the guise ofthe duty of good faith and 
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fair dealing to rebalance the economic benefits that flow to the parties under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
As such, summary judgment as to Count 4 is GRANTED. 
Count 5: Oppression 
Miller asserts Lynch and the Thermo Entities "consistently undermined the reasonable 
expectations of the minority members" and prejudiced the minority members through 
burdensome, harsh, and wrongful conduct in violation of the standards of fair play. The parties 
dispute whether Delaware recognizes a claim for oppression. From a reading of the Delaware 
cases cited to the Court by both parties, the Court is not convinced that Delaware recognizes an 
independent cause of action for oppression. Even if such a claim was cognizable, as in Gagliardi 
v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996), Miller fails to allege or present 
evidence of any gross or oppressive abuse of discretion by Defendants-Miller's termination and 
the ultimate request for redemption of interests-were actions expressly permitted under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
As such, summary judgment as to Count 5 is GRANTED. 
Count 6: Declaratory Judgment (Vesting and Redemption) and Count 7: 
Declaratory Judgment (Gain Percentages) 
Miller claims that provisions in the Fifth Amendment regarding the vesting and 
redemption rights (Section 4.5(b)) and the definition of "Gain Percentages" were 
unconscionable, procured under economic duress, and lacked consideration and seek a 
declaration of the unenforceability of these provisions. The Court has addressed and rejected the 
economic duress argument. 
Delaware courts will find an agreement unconscionable in limited circumstances: 
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Traditionally, a contract will be found unconscionable where no man in his senses 
and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest or fair man 
would accept, on the other. It is generally held that the unconscionability test 
involves the question of whether the provision amounts to the taking of an unfair 
advantage by one party over the other. But mere disparity between the bargaining 
powers of parties to a contract will not support a finding of unconscionability. A 
court must find that the party with superior bargaining power used it to take unfair 
advantage of his weaker counterpart. For a contract clause to be unconscionable, 
its terms must be so one-sided as to be oppressive. But courts are particularly 
reluctant to find unconscionability in contracts between sophisticated 
corporations. 
Reserves Mgmt., LLC v. Am. Acquisition Prop. 1, LLC, No. 673,2012,2014 WL 823407, ~ 36 
(Del. Feb. 28, 2014) (internal quotations omitted). "When parties have ordered their affairs 
voluntarily through a binding contract, Delaware law is strongly inclined to respect their 
agreement, and will only interfere upon a strong showing that dishonoring the contract is 
required to vindicate a public policy interest even stronger than freedom of contract." James v. 
Nat'! Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d 799, 812-13 (Del. Ch. 2016) (quoting Libeau v. Fox, 880 A.2d 1049, 
1056-57 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd in pertinent part, 892 A.2d 1068 (Del. 2006». Tellingly, the 
Court could not find a single case finding an LLC operating agreement executed by sophisticated 
parties to be unconscionable, but did find a myriad of cases in which claims of unconscionable 
contracts between sophisticated parties were dismissed. See, e.g., FdG Logistics LLC v. A&R 
Logistics Ho!dings, Inc., 131 A.3d 842, 862 (Del. Ch. 2016) (dismissing claim for failure to state 
a claim because no facts were plead demonstrating enforcement of the Merger Agreement would 
be unconscionable); Progressive Int'! Corp. v. E.1 Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. c.A. 19209, 
2002 WL 1558382, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2002) (granting motion to dismiss claim that License 
Agreement was unconscionable). 
Here, FiberLight accepted millions of dollars' worth of convertible loans from the 
Thermo Entities. Miller understood that if the Thermo Entities chose to convert this debt to 
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equity, their interest in FiberLight would far surpass his own. Indeed, the conversion resulted in 
the Thermo Entities holding approximately 98% interest in FiberLight while Miller's interest 
was less than 1 %. It is not surprising that in exchange for this large investment, a party would 
want substantial benefits flowing from their significant investment. There is no evidence that the 
Fifth Amendment, or specifically these two provisions, were so one-sided as to be 
unconscionable. 
As such, summary judgment as to Counts 6 and 7 is GRANTED. 
Count 8: Punitive damages and Count 9: Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 
O.e.G.A. § 13-6-11 
As none of Miller's claims have survived summary judgment, summary judgment as to 
Counts 8 and 9 is GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED this2-1 da 
Judge Christopher Bras r n behalf of 
ELIZABETH E. LONG, NIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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